With the threat of an avian flu pandemic once again looming over eastern India, issues regarding patents and affordability and accessibility of drugs have taken center stage. The key priority of India should be to remain prepared to address the public health crisis effectively, by stockpiling the drug tamiflu so that it can be easily distributed and administered to the needy.
INTRODUCTION
Recently, the specter of an avian flu pandemic has raised its ugly head again, with reports of new deaths in China, Indonesia, and Vietnam. The first victims to die in South Asia have also been reported. 1 It has now traveled to West Bengal, an eastern state in India where more than 13 districts have been reported to be affected. If this problem is not nipped in the bud, there is an impending danger of it quickly spreading to adjacent states. While India is currently grappling with national logistical pressures to ward off the threat, the issue of patents, prices, and access to avian influenza treatments has once again come up in the international forums as well as in India.
There is a world of difference between epidemics of influenza and HIV/AIDS regarding the respective public health challenges they pose; they mark the polar ends of a spectrum of complexity in the necessary public health measures to combat them. HIV/AIDS is a prolonged epidemic, infection is surreptitious, healthy persons harbour the virus for life (as of now), and the incubation period is measured in months to years, but it is non-
contagious. An epidemic of influenza on the other hand will be short-lived, spread fast and wide, and will disrupt normal societal and institutional functioning. The incubation period and the infectious period are both very short -just a few days. 2 Hence, we cannot wait for the pandemic to occur as the deadly avian influenza would not give us time for preparation.
Therefore, the strategy to counter the threat of avian flu has to be totally different from that of HIV/AIDS and the first step should be to create stockpiles of Tamiflu that can be easily distributed and administered during the pandemic.
India has one of the broadest and most comprehensive compulsory licensing systems, which goes "'much beyond national emergency and extreme [ly] suggests that the Indian Government appears much more cautious in employing these flexibilities for pharmaceutical patent matters, and has been reluctant to take a decisive stand on the issue. 4 The objective of this paper is to explore the various flexibilities provided in the TRIPS Agreement and incorporated into India's Patent (Amendments) Act of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to:
(1) suggest short-term (immediate measures) and long-term strategies that India may adopt to ward off the current crisis, and prepare itself for handling such national emergencies and public health crises in future; and (2) examine whether it would be administratively feasible and economically viable for the Indian generic pharmaceutical industry to supply drugs and medicines to the countries having insufficient or no capacity to manufacture them themselves.
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This paper is organized into five sections. Section I presents a bird's eye view of avian influenza to contextualize the issue at hand. Section II discusses the dispute regarding the patent of Tamiflu (Osteltamivir Phosphate) and the status of the Tamiflu patent in India, and also briefly touches upon the position of Roche, Inc., the producer of Tamiflu. Section III explores the various legal provisions available in India's Patent law that may be employed to address the challenges posed by an avian influenza pandemic. Section III also highlights the differences of opinion between the Indian firms and the multi-national companies (MNCs) with regard to these flexibilities, and the potential disputes that may arise if these flexibilities are exploited. Section IV details the issues relating to 'administrative feasibility' and 'economic viability' of these flexibilities. Section V briefly outlines India's response during 4 the similar crisis in 2005-06 to highlight the importance of the 'political viability' aspect of employing these flexibilities. The paper concludes with the outline of a strategy that may be adopted by India to address the current crisis, and with the observation that in matters such as these having international ramifications, the political will of the government is more critical for success than merely having laws, rules, and regulations on the books.
I. CONTEXTUALIZING THE ISSUE
A. Global Scenario "Avian influenza, or 'bird flu,' is a contagious virus that normally infects only birds but occasionally crosses the species barrier to infect humans." 6 In 1997 a particular strain of avian influenza, the H5N1 virus, infected 18 people in Hong Kong, killing 6 of them. 
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'Relenza,' made by GlaxoSmithKline, is also an antiviral medicine. However, it is more difficult to administer compared to Tamiflu. While Relenza must be inhaled, Tamiflu is given orally in capsule form. 17 Yeh, supra note 6. research studies have shown that Tamiflu is effective against the H5N1 avian and human virus strains.
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As the exclusive manufacturer of Tamiflu, Roche has had difficulty meeting the strong demand for the patented drug. According to the company, manufacturing the drug is a complicated process involving ten main steps and taking from six to eight months to produce a capsule of Tamiflu, once all the raw materials have been sourced. 19 The World Health
Organization has estimated that at Roche's present manufacturing capacity, "it will take a decade to produce enough oseltamivir to treat 20% of the world's population."
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The Tamiflu production shortage had prompted both international and domestic pressures on Roche to relax its patent monopoly and permit other companies to manufacture 41 It will take not less than one and a half years even if they were processed on fast track basis. Thus, since no product patent is granted to Roche, the process patents would not cause any hindrance to the Indian pharmaceutical industry to manufacture Tamiflu because they can produce Tamiflu by alternative processes without infringing the processes patented by Roche.
III. EXPLORING THE FLEXIBILITIES
Although the mailbox applications are pending examinations and they may mature as patents, the critical issue is what options are available to India to address the immediate threat of avian influenza, and also to deal with such situations in future. This section will explain various legal provisions of the Patent Act that can be exploited by the government and the Indian pharmaceutical industry.
A. Pre-Patent Options

Challenge the Mailbox Application by Filing a Pre-grant Opposition
One obvious choice for the Indian firms is to challenge the mailbox applications filed by Gilead for the product so that it does not fructify into a patent. Section 25 of the Act provides for pre-grant opposition for pending patent applications. The pre-grant opposition may be filed virtually on all grounds of 'patentability criteria' specified under the Patent Act. 42 The Act has also expanded the opportunities for filing a pre-grant opposition, as "any person" can now file one. 43 Basheer has suggested some grounds for filing a pre-grant opposition in the instant case. 
Prior User Rights vis-à-vis Patents from Mailbox Applications
The Act introduced a new proviso in Section 11A:
On and from the date of publication of the application for patent and until the date of grant of a patent in respect of such application, the applicant Id.
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Id. 48 Mueller, supra note, 3, (e.g. In 2006, a pre-grant opposition was collectively filed by the Indian Network of People Living with HIV/AIDS, the Manipur Network of Positive People, and the Lawyers' Collective HIV/AIDS Unit in the Kolkata branch of the Indian Patent Office against the grant of a patent on Glaxo's combination therapy sold under the brand name 'combivir' for HIV/AIDS) 49 For example, Indian cancer patients (along with generic drug manufacturers) filed a pre-grant opposition against the grant of a patent on Novartis' claimed beta-crystalline form of imatinib mesylate, the active ingredient in an anti-cancer drug sold by Swiss pharmaceutical manufacturer Novartis AG under the brand name Gleevec . the pre-grant opposition was filed under Section 3(d) of the Act claiming that Gleevec was "a new form of an old drug". PATENT OFFICE 4400, 2006 , available at http://patentoffice.nic.in/ipr/patent/journal_archieve/journal_2006/pat_arch_022006/official_journal_17022 006.pdf (confirming that "the Patent application 1602/Mas/98 was refused by the Controller as a result of pre-grant opposition"). The Controller's refusal of Novartis's patent application also had the effect of extinguishing its EMR, which had been the subject of ongoing litigation in the High Courts.
shall have the like privileges and rights as if a patent for the invention had been granted on the date of publication of the application:
Provided that the applicant shall not be entitled to institute any proceedings for infringement until the patent has been granted: Provided further that the rights of a patentee in respect of [mailbox] applications made under sub-section (2) of section 5 before the 1st day of January, 2005 shall accrue from the date of grant of the patent:
Provided also that after a patent is granted in respect of [mailbox] applications made under sub-section (2) This newly added proviso to Section 11A of the Act considerably dilutes the monopoly granted to pharmaceutical patents arising out of mailbox applications. It prohibits infringement lawsuits specific to patents that are issued after January 1, 2005 from mailbox applications, if a competing firm has made "significant investment" and was already "producing and marketing" (presumably in India) the patented product prior to January 1,
2005.
51 Owners of the effected patents are entitled to recover only "reasonable royalties" for ongoing infringement; injunctive relief and infringement lawsuits are precluded. 52 This provision combines features of both the "prior user right[s]" defense and "compulsory licensing." 53 The distinction, however, is that a 'prior user right' is generally implemented as a complete defense to infringement, disallowing recovery of any damages by the patentee from the prior user. According to the provision under Section 11A(7), though, the patentee is entitled to recovery of "reasonable royalty" even if the competitor had not obtained any governmental (or patentee) approval before undertaking its manufacturing of the nowpatented drug.
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The Patent (Amendment) Act §11A (7) TRIPS, supra note 56, at art. 27.1 (requiring that patent rights shall be "enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology and whether products are imported or locally produced").
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TRIPS, supra note 56, at art. 28.1(a) (requiring that where the subject matter of a patent is a product, the patent owner shall have the exclusive rights to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product. . . .) 60 TRIPS, supra note 5, at art. 28.1(a) (mandating that the patent owner shall have the exclusive rights "to prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes that product"). patent infringement lawsuit, the statute does not specify how owners of patents issuing from mailbox applications are to establish their claim for "reasonable" royalties, let alone how the amount of such royalties will be determined.
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On the other hand, the indigenous firms see this provision as critical to the protection of their industry and a legitimate interpretation and exploitation of the flexibilities provided to India by the TRIPS Agreement's transition period arrangements.
62 Though this controversial remedies limitation has not yet been tested, it certainly has the potential to catalyze the filing of another dispute proceeding against India in the WTO.
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B. Post Patent Options
While no mail box applications filed by Gilead/Roche have yet matured into patents, if any of them does, the following legal options are available to the Indian firms for production of Tamiflu.
Voluntary Licenses
An Indian generic manufacturing firm could approach Roche and obtain a voluntary Though the Act stipulates that the generic manufacturers would have to pay a "reasonable royalty" to the patent holder, it does not define the term "reasonable." Love asserts that "soon a large number of compulsory licenses will be issued for products now manufactured in India, which are subject to the mailbox patents. This will increase the familiarity with compulsory licensing and provide needed expertise in setting reasonable remuneration to patent owners. 
Compulsory Licenses a. Section 84
If an attempt to obtain a voluntary license fails, any generic manufacturer could invoke the provisions of Section 84 of the Act by filing an application for a compulsory license on any of the following three grounds:
(1) the 'reasonable requirements' of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied;
(2) the patented invention is unavailable to the public at a 'reasonably affordable price'; or (3) the patented invention is not 'worked' in the territory of India. Interview with M. Sirinivas Reddy, Director Marketing, Hetero Drugs. He declined to reveal the details of the deal but market sources say that the royalty was fixed somewhere between 10 to 15%.
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See Basheer, supra note 4. The generic company Hetero had already arrived at a generic version of Tamiflu and had even drug marketing approval prior to entering into a license arrangement with Roche.
68
Id.
Ground One -Section 84(1)(a) "Reasonable Requirements" of the Public
The first ground on which a Section 84 compulsory license may be sought is when "reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the patented invention have not been satisfied." The generic firm interested in getting a license under this provision will have to show that Roche and Hetero are unable to produce enough drugs to meet the requirements of public.
Both the MNCs and the Indian generic manufacturers do not seem to be satisfied with this provision. While on one hand, the MNCs claim that the statutory scheme gives the Controller virtually unfettered discretion in determining whether this criterion has been satisfied, 69 on the other hand, the Indian generic manufacturers feel that this clause is sloppily drafted as it leaves lot of room for interpretation. 70 The MNCs also say that not only this clause sloppily drafted, but more importantly given the breadth of its wording, virtually any refusal of a patentee to license could be deemed prejudicial to some form of trade in India.
71
Moreover, they feel that this ground can even be satisfied not only when a domestic industry is harmed by a patentee's refusal to license, but also when that refusal means that "a market for export of the patented article manufactured in India is not being supplied or developed."
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The MNCs further contend that this provision is contrary to the TRIPS Agreement as reference to supplying export markets remains in the general-purpose Section 84 Avenue of compulsory licensing and is not confined to the new Section 92A procedure. The
Government of India has endeavored to address this issue through amendment of Section 90 of the Act, by providing that the Controller "shall endeavor to secure" that a compulsory license "is granted with a predominant purpose of supply in the Indian market and that the licensee may also export the patented product, if need be in accordance with the provisions of 69 Dr. GL Telang, Saumil Mody, Roche Scientific Company (India) Pvt. Ltd.; Sree Patel, GlaxoSmithKline They were of the opinion that statute provides that this criterion has not been satisfied if any of a host of various circumstances listed in the section is not fulfilled. See § 84(7)(a)-(e), Patent (Amendments) Act, (2005). sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of sub-section (7) of section 84;" however, the true test will come when the provision is implemented.
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Ground 2 -Section 84(1)(b) Unavailability at a Reasonable Price
The second ground on which a compulsory patent license can be sought under Section 84 is that "the patented invention is not available to the public at a reasonably affordable price."
Since the statute provides no guidance as to how the Controller is to determine what a "reasonably affordable price" is, the license seeker under Section 84(1)(b) must make out a prima facie case. 74 The patent owner would have an opportunity to counter the compulsory license applicant's evidence with the patentee's own evidence by initiating an opposition procedure.
In the instant case, it may be difficult to invoke this provision for obtaining CL on this ground. Hetero is currently selling Tamiflu at Rs. 75/-per tablet to the government and since Cipla is selling the generic equivalent of the same at Rs. 65/-, so it may be difficult to establish that the Hetero's drug is unaffordable.
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Ground 3 -Section 84(1)(c) Failure to Work the Patent
The third ground on which a Section 84 compulsory license may be issued is that the "patented invention is not worked in the territory of India."
Although in the instant case this ground cannot be invoked because no patent has been granted on Tamiflu in India, this provision has raised the maximum ire of foreign patentees.
The MNCs contend that if the word "worked" is not interpreted broadly enough to encompass imports, then the patented pharmaceutical products that are manufactured outside of India but imported into India for sale could also be subjected to compulsory license under Section 84(1)(c), and is in contravention to the 'non-discrimination' provision of are not granted merely to enable patentees to enjoy a monopoly for the importation of the patented article. 77 Mueller asserts that this controversial provision which retains working requirements as a tool for domestic economic enhancement will undoubtedly be challenged by those MNCs which strongly prefer to consolidate production facilities in order to achieve economies of scale and related efficiencies.
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Since there is no definitive WTO ruling 79 existing on the apparent conflict between retention of local working requirements as a compulsory licensing trigger and the nondiscrimination provision of TRIPS Art. 27.1., this unresolved conflict may be re-ignited by India's new pharmaceutical product patents regime and the susceptibility of foreign-owned product patents to compulsory licensing.
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It may, however, be noted that the provisions under Section 84 can be invoked only after the expiry of three years after the grant of the patent. Hence, compulsory license cannot be issued for production of Tamiflu under this provision.
b. Compulsory License U/s 92: Notification by Government
The second way of obtaining a compulsory license is under Section 92 of the Act. The government can resort to this provision to foster stockpiling of Oseltamivir in the event of avian flu pandemic. However, whether the government would invoke this provision is a million dollar question and it depends upon the political will of the government. 
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See Patent (Amendments) Act, § 84(6)(iv) (2005) (stipulating that in considering a compulsory license application filed under Section 84, the Controller shall take into account whether the applicant has made efforts to obtain a license from the patentee on reasonable terms and conditions and such efforts have not been successful within a 'reasonable period' of time. For the purposes of clause (iv), a 'reasonable period' shall be construed as "a period not ordinarily exceeding a period of six months."). (1) (2005). It provides that a compulsory license shall be available for manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the pharmaceutical sector for the concerned product to address public health problems, provided that a compulsory license has been granted by such country or such incorporates the flexibilities granted in the August 30 Decision. The Act defines the relevant 'pharmaceutical products' as "any patented product, or product manufactured through a patented process, of the pharmaceutical sector needed to address public health problems and shall be inclusive of ingredients necessary for their manufacture and diagnostic kits required for their use."
86 An application for a compulsory license under Section 92A can be filed at any time after a patent has been issued. Unlike Section 84, the Act does not provide for any procedural mechanisms allowing the patent owner to oppose the grant of a compulsory license under Section 92A
The MNCs are extremely critical of wording of Section 92A. The debate is whether the compulsory license framework provided under Section 92A is compliant with the analogous TRIPS provisions. Mueller argues that India's implementation goes beyond what has been provided for in the August 30 Decision. She notes that India does not require as a prerequisite for issuing a Section 92A compulsory license that the importing country have already granted (or intends to grant in the future) its own compulsory license to permit the import of the patented pharmaceuticals in the importing country (assuming that a patent covering the imported product is in force there). It is enough if the importing country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products from India.
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The MNCs also allege that in contrast with anti-diversionary provisions of the August 30
Decision, India's Section 92A is completely silent on any obligation of the Indian government or the compulsory licensee to specify the amount of pharmaceutical products that will be exported, to specially label or mark those products, or to make public any information about the export. 88 On the contrary, the Indian generic manufacturers argue that the fears of the MNCs are unfounded because the Controller has wide discretion to set the terms and conditions of a Section 92A compulsory license and the Controller could, in each individual case, set a quantity limit on the amount of pharmaceutical product to be made and exported, country has, by notification or otherwise, allowed importation of the patented pharmaceutical products from India. Id.
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See Patent (Amendments) Act, § 92 Explanation (2005).
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See Mueller, supra note 3. require the licensee to specially package or mark its products, or impose other limits and obligations.
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There are not currently many serious issues with respect to this provision. In the long run, it is expected that as with other open questions concerning India's new patent law, the TRIPS compliance issue may turn on the manner in which India actually implements its Section 92A framework. Widespread use of the Section 92A for compulsory license to export patented medicines appears likely. 90 There are currently fifty countries recognized by the WTO and the United Nations as least-developed countries, 91 so the available export market for Indian generic companies is potentially very significant. But whether the Indian generic manufacturers would utilize this flexibility is a question of economic viability that is discussed later in the paper.
Parallel Imports
Another important flexibility that can be exploited is the provision of parallel imports.
The Act adopts the principle of "international exhaustion of patent rights." 92 The Act goes even further, by shielding importation of products acquired from sources other than the patentee in countries not yet recognizing product patent protection. Section 107A(b) of the Act provides that:
Importation of patented products by any person from a person, who is duly authorized under the law to produce and sell or distribute the product, shall not be considered as a infringement of patent rights. Interview with Amar Lulla, Joint MD of leading generic company Cipla takes the position that even in situations where it will now be prevented by the new product patent regime from copying and selling patented medicines within India, it would nevertheless be able to make those products for export to leastdeveloped countries and to any other countries that have the legal right to import those products.
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As of August 2006, the WTO recognized 50 member countries as least developed countries in accordance with the United Nations' designation. See World Trade Organization, Least-Developed Countries, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org7_e.htm. It has been suggested that Indian generic firms could capitalize on the breadth of this provision "by shifting their manufacturing base to neighboring LDCs such as Bangladesh (which have time till 2015 to shift to a pharmaceutical product patents regime) and importing the same into India." Such a strategy is not far-fetched. In fact, generic pharmaceutical production is already well established in Bangladesh. For example, Beximco, the leading generic drug manufacturer in Bangladesh, has already launched production of "Oseflu," its version of the bird flu anti-viral Tamiflu, which is the subject of pending patent applications in India that are assigned to Hoffman-La Roche. 
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See Basheer, supra note 54. Since there is no requirement that the patentee have sold the good in the country from where it is exported, the provision virtually extinguishes the exclusive right to import. See id. Inventions for Purposes of Government') and Section 47 of the Act ('Government use of inventions') without running the risk of being sued for infringement.
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No doubt, the provisions under Chapter XII and Section 47 are wide in scope and can be invoked to help manufacture Oseltamivir for use in government hospitals and other entities that are related to the government.The real issue is whether India has a public health infrastructure in place to ensure that the drugs are supplied to all the infected through the government machinery, or whether supply of drug through private channels would also be construed as being for the "purpose of Government?" Since the TRIPS Agreement is silent on these subtle issues, perhaps the best answer is to interpret these provisions to address the public health needs and run the risk of litigation. Once again, this leads to the question of political will of the government that is discussed later in this paper.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE FEASIBILITY AND ECONOMIC VIABILITY
The discussions in the preceding sections highlight various legal options that could be strategically employed by the Indian government and the Indian generic firms to aid the continued manufacturing of affordable generics in the post-TRIPS era. However, mere existence of this legal framework does not ensure that the Indian firms will necessarily be able to effectively use it. They will exploit these flexibilities only if they are procedurally simple to administer and are economically viable. Indian firms and patent law experts have expressed reservations about the efficacy of these provisions due to procedural constraints and economic viability.
A. Procedural Constraints
The Act broadly allows for compulsory licensing in two circumstances; supply of patented drugs and medicines within the country itself (under Sections 84 and 92) and manufacture of drugs for export to poor countries having insufficient or no capacity to produce drugs (under Section 92A).
Though the compulsory licensing provision existed in the Patent Act of 1970, it was redundant in the pre-TRIPS era because the Indian firms could develop their own processes and produce the patented drugs. But Decision or the 'parallel imports' provision to reap profits of their own in this manner.
The economic viability of the provision under Section 92A is seriously suspect due to the fact that exporting patented drugs to poor countries in the post-TRIPS era is an activity that entails very thin profit margins. The August 30 obligations mandate the grant of compulsory licenses for a specific purpose, i.e. a specific drug, and for limited duration. All of the production must be exported to the requesting importer country. This puts severe limitations on the ability of generic drug manufacturers to produce post-TRIPS drugs, as it may preclude them from generating more cost-effective economies of scale. Although the need for anti-diversionary provisions to discourage trade diversion in the August 30 Decision cannot be questioned, it limits the ability of producers to achieve economies of scale and maintain sustainable production levels. It also imposes substantial costs on the manufacturer and makes production under compulsory licensing commercially unviable.
118
The obligation of the exporting country to provide "adequate remuneration" 119 to the patent holder further limits the commercial viability of the generic firms in two ways. First, the generic firms, who are already operating on very thin margins, will have to pay royalties to the patent holder. Second, since the Decision fails to define the term "adequate," it leaves room for interpretation leading to costly legal proceedings in case the patent holder is not satisfied with the "remuneration." It also leaves the patentee with the option threaten with trade sanctions, as the US did in the South African case. 120 Furthermore, since post-TRIPS drugs are not currently being produced in India, filling a request from an importer country could entail a delay of months to years. To manufacture such pharmaceutical products, firms must spend time and money determining how to produce the product, conducting bio- have to build new production facilities both to manufacture the targeted products for the specified markets, and to comply with the safeguards imposed by the August 30 Decision.
All of these requirements impose additional costs on the generic firms. These costs, compared to perhaps limited benefits, will go into a firm's decision as to whether to make the up-front investment in production.
IV. POLITICAL VIABILITY
The product patent regime is still in a state of infancy in India and not many instances have come where the compulsory licensing system could have been tested, except the scare of avian influenza in 2005-06. The aftermath of that experience illustrates how the government of India shied away from taking a decisive stand in the matter.
There was a real threat of avian influenza in 2005-06 and the following three options were available to help facilitate production of Tamiflu:
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(1) Since only a process patent was granted to M/s Roche for the manufacture of Tamiflu in April 2005 and a mail box application concerning a product patent on Tamiflu was pending, the Indian manufacturers could have manufactured generic version of Tamiflu by following a different process. Any infringement of a process patent by other manufacturers was a matter between the process patent holder and the generic manufacturer. There was not any issue/problem from the regulatory point of view. As per the situation at the relevant time, the regulatory office could evaluate and permit a subsequent firm to market a drug if on the basis of mailbox application, a product patent had yet not been considered.
(2) The generic manufacturing firm could approach Roche and obtain a voluntary license. Surely, one could not state with any certainty that the avian flu would definitely mutate to a form easily communicable among humans. However, the threat was a very real one and if it strikes, it will do so mercilessly -without giving any time for preparation.
Because the government of India chose to ignore this fact, it suggests that it might not readily invoke compulsory licensing or government use provisions. It may be relevant to point out here that later in February 2006, avian influenza was reported in Navapur, Nandurbar District, Maharashtra State and Uchchhal, District Surat, and Gujarat State. The case clearly shows that despite having a well laid down legal provisions in the statute book, 'political viability' and political economy takes precedence over national and public interest.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that though there are differences in opinion regarding the TRIPS compliance issues vis-à-vis the provisions laid down in the Patent The strategy in brief may be outlined as follows:
(1)
As a first step, the Indian companies should continue to effectively oppose the mailbox application of Gilead to ensure that no patent is granted. In the meantime, the government can place orders with Ranbaxy and Cipla to manufacture generic version of Tamiflu and create adequate stockpiles. Though Ranbaxy and Cipla claim to have developed an alternative process for manufacturing generic versions of Tami flu, if need be the Controller could issue the compulsory license and the generic manufacturers could manufacture generic versions of Tamiflu even by infringing the process patent.
(2) If a patent is ultimately granted and an adequate stockpile has not been created, the government should first ask Roche whether it can supply the required quantity of the drug at the same rate as that of generic manufacturers. If Roche is agreeable to such option, it should be paid a license fee. This arrangement should continue only while the emergency exists. If Roche does not agree to such terms and conditions, the Government may invoke Section 47 to authorize the creation of stockpiles.
(3)
If the avian flu pandemic does occur, the Controller can declare national emergency or public health urgency and issue compulsory licenses under Section 92 to indigenous companies like Ranbaxy and Cipla to manufacture generic versions of Tamiflu. In such an eventuality, the Government can also resort to the provisions under Section 47 and Chapter XVII of the Act.
The concerns and limitations regarding administrative feasibility and economic viability discussed in the section IV may not come in the way of production of Tamiflu. This is because avian flu is an example of a potential public health emergency, where it may be easier to invoke the compulsory licensing or government use provisions. Moreover, since many Governments are stockpiling Tamiflu to cater to a potential pandemic, the magnitude of exports is likely to offset the lower margins per drug sold to developing or least developed countries. However, for other drugs, it is not clear whether the provisions of compulsory licensing will be exploited.
The preceding discussion also points out that the 'access' to drugs does not necessarily depend on the mere existence of legal 'flexibilities.' One must also consider whether such flexibilities will be exploited by the by generic manufacturers and the government. This decision will largely depend upon the 'procedural simplicity,' as well as the 'economic' and 'political' viability.
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See Patent (Amendments) Act, § 47 (2005) . It deals with the "Government Use of Inventions". It dispenses with the need to pay any royalties.
Finally, compulsory licensing in general, and the August 30 rules more specifically, are an untested system. While India has created the legal framework for compulsory licensing making use of the August 30 procedures in the Act, so far they have never been invoked and there is general feeling that the Government may not be politically inclined to issue such compulsory licenses. 123 In addition to the formal legal regime, in order to grant compulsory licenses for exporting, the government of India must develop the bureaucracy to process and issue compulsory licenses in an efficient and effective manner.
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Industries perception in view of the response of the government in tackling Avian flu disaster
